Un Boeing 737 d'Ethiopian Airlines s'écrase 157 morts

Re: Un Boeing 737 d'Ethiopian Airlines s'écrase 157 morts

Message non lupar Teledrone » 17 Juil 2019 10:23

Bonjour, lu sur le WEB

Aerobuz :

Michael tolini
Je ne suis pas un brillant ingenieur aeronautique comme vous (mon domaine d’expertise se limite a l’electronique), mais ayant travaille de nombreuses annees dans la plus grande usine aeronautique du monde, j’ai recement evoque
les problemes du 737 Max avec un ancien collegue qui est toujours en poste a l’usine de Forth Worth au Texas.
Il a evoque la volonte de Boeing de ne pas avoir voulu modifier le train d’atterrissage du 737 Max dans le souci de contenir les couts de developpement.
D’une maniere plus generale, les problemes de Boeing viennent d’un changement de mentalite ou les criteres de rentabilite prevalent sur ceux de la securite. Pour couronner le tout, on vient d’apprendre que la societe indienne en charge du
developpement de certains logiciels, n’avait pas d’expertise particuliere en aeronautique.

Dernier point, les 100 millions de dollars promis par Boeing ne sont qu’une goutte d’eau au regards des surcouts engendres par les problemes actuels. Selon Bloomberg les sommes en question depasseraient les couts de developpement du 737 Max.


Cette déclaration est confirmée par le mail que j'ai reçu :

Les études sur les problèmes relatifs au maintien ou changement du train d'atterrissage de ce nouvel avion auraient été faits par des informaticiens (probablement en Inde) payés 9 US$ de l'heure
The old Boeing would have redesigned the plane, but the McDonnell Douglas influenced Boeing new one tried to?patch the problem with software. And it was bad software, written by?to engineers?paid $9/dollar an hour. The Federal Aviation Administration, having outsourced much of its own regulatory capacity to Boeing, didn?t know what was going on, and Boeing didn?t tell airlines and pilots about the new safety elements.



Objet : TR: Fwd: The Coming Boeing Bailout?




Le 14/07/2019, à 00:33, Dick Morton a écrit :


No comment, just the messenger.
Hi,
Welcome to Big, a newsletter about the politics of monopoly. If you like it, you can sign?up here. Today I?ll discuss how a merger in the 1990s ruined Boeing, and why the government will have to step in to save the company.

?
Let?s start by admiring the company that was Boeing, so we can know what has been lost. As one journalist?put it in 2000, ?Boeing has always been less a business than an association of engineers devoted to building amazing flying machines.?
For the bulk of the 20th century, Boeing made miracles. Its engineers designed the B-52 in a weekend, bet the company on the 707, and built the 747 despite deep observer skepticism. The 737 started coming off the assembly line in 1967, and it was such a good design it was still the company?s top moneymaker thirty years later.
How did Boeing make miracles in civilian aircraft? In short, the the civilian engineers were in charge. And it fell apart because the company, due to a merger, killed its engineering-first culture.
What Happened?
In 1993, a Defense official in the Clinton administration, Bill Perry, called defense contractor CEOs to a dinner, nicknamed ?the last supper.? He told them to merge with each other so as, in the classic excuse used by monopolists, to find efficiencies in their businesses. The rationale was that post-Cold War era military spending reductions demanded a leaner defense base. In reality, Perry had been a long-time mergers and acquisitions specialist working with industry ally Norm Augustine, the eventual CEO of Lockheed Martin.
Perry was so aggressive about encouraging mergers that he put together a strategy to have the Pentagon itself pay merger costs, which resulted in a bevy of consolidation among contractors and subcontractors. In 1997, Boeing, with both a commercial and military division, ended up buying McDonnell Douglas, a major aerospace company and competitor. With this purchase, the airline market radically consolidated.
Unlike Boeing, McDonnell Douglas was run by financiers rather than engineers. And though Boeing was the buyer, McDonnell Douglas executives somehow took power in what analysts started calling a ?reverse takeover.? The joke in Seattle was, "McDonnell Douglas bought Boeing with Boeing's money."
The merger sparked a war between the engineers and the bean-counters; as one analyst?put it, "Some of the board of directors would rather have spent money on a walk-in humidor for shareholders than on a new plane."?The white collar engineers responded to the aggressive cost-cutting and politically motivated design choices with the unthinkable, affiliating with the AFL-CIO and?going on strike?for the first time in the company?s 56-year history. "We weren't fighting against Boeing," said the union leader. "We were fighting to save Boeing."
The key corporate protection that had protected Boeing engineering culture was a wall inside the company between the civilian division and military divisions. This wall was designed to prevent the military procurement process from corrupting civilian aviation. As aerospace engineer Pierre Sprey?noted, military procurement and engineering created a corrupt design process, with unnecessary complexity, poor safety standards, ?wishful thinking projections? on performance, and so forth. Military contractors subcontract based on political concerns, not engineering ones. If contractors need to influence a Senator from Montana, they will place production of a component in Montana, even if no one in the state can do the work.
Bad procurement is one reason (aside from military officials going into defense contracting work) why military products are often poor quality or deficient. For instance, the incredibly expensive joint strike fighter F-35 is?a mess, and the Navy?s most expensive aircraft carrier, costing $13 billion, was recently delivered?without critical elevators?to lift bombs into fighter jets. Much of this dynamic exists because of a lack of competition in contracting for major systems, a result of the consolidation Perry pushed in the early 1990s. Monopolies don?t have to produce good quality products, and often don?t.
At any rate, when McDonnell Douglas took over Boeing, the military procurement guys took over aerospace production and design. The company began a radical outsourcing campaign, done for political purposes. In defense production, plants went to influence Senators and Congressmen; in civilian production, Boeing started moving production to different countries in return for airline purchases from the national airlines.
Engineers immediately?recognized?this offshoring as a disaster in the making. In 2001, a Boeing employee named L. Hart Smith published?a paper?criticizing the business strategy behind offshoring production, noting that vital engineering tasks were being done in ways that seemed less costly but would end up destroying the company. He was quickly proved right.
The first disaster was Boeing?s 787 Dreamliner, a test case in how to attempt to cut costs and end up driving up expenses. The company?went over?budget by something like $12-18 billion. As Sprey put it, ?You don't have to be wearing a deer-stalker hat to deduce that the rotten practices bred by DoD procurement have finally infected the executive suite of Boeing's commercial division.? Aside from the offshoring of key capacity, the 787 had significant engineering problems, including electrical systems that caused?battery fires?on the planes.
In 2005, Boeing hired its first ever CEO without an aviation engineering background, bringing in James McNerney, who got his training in brand management at Proctor & Gamble, then McKinsey, and then spent two decades at General Electric learning from Jack Welch how to erode industrial capacity in favor of shareholders. He brought these lessons to Boeing, and greenlit the 737 Max to compete with a more fuel-efficient Airbus model.
The key decision was, rather than just build a new plane, was to upgrade the 737 model. That way, airlines would be able to buy the plane and not have to retrain their pilots, as pilots must be re-certified for a new aircraft model but don?t have to be recertified for upgrades of old models. But this choice caused significant problems, because the aerodynamics of the 737 body didn?t fit with the Max?s engine, which was obvious during the?first wind tunnel tests.
The testing in 2012, with air flow approaching the speed of sound, allowed?engineers to analyze how the airplane?s aerodynamics would handle a range of extreme maneuvers. When the data came back, according to an engineer involved in the testing, it was clear there was an issue to address.
The old Boeing would have redesigned the plane, but the McDonnell Douglas influenced Boeing new one tried to?patch the problem with software. And it was bad software, written by?to engineers?paid $9/dollar an hour. The Federal Aviation Administration, having outsourced much of its own regulatory capacity to Boeing, didn?t know what was going on, and Boeing didn?t tell airlines and pilots about the new safety elements.
This disregard for engineering integrity and safety had come from the Wall Street driven financialization of the 1990s, through General Electric?s McNerney, but also from military procurement culture. Current CEO Dennis Muilenburg, for instance, has presided over a series of problematic projects in the defense division, from the X-32, the losing entry in the F-35 joint strike fighter contract, to the Airborne Laser system. Muilenburg has handled the 737 Max problem the way a defense official would, through public relations and political channels rather than the way a civilian engineer would, which would be through an aggressively honest review of engineering choices.
The net effect of the merger, and the follow-on managerial and financial choices, is that America significantly damaged its aerospace industry. Where there were two competitors - McDonnell Douglas and Boeing, now there is one. And that domestic monopoly can no longer develop good civilian aerospace products. Hundreds of people are dead, and tens of billions of dollars wasted.
Boeing now has a rocky situation ahead of it. There is little trust in the current leadership of the company, and it will face significant liability from airlines who bought the jet, as well as mass cancelations of orders. There is?a criminal investigation into the company, as there should be. This like likely to have significant and severe financial consequences.
The right policy path would be Congressional hearings to explore what happened to this once fine company, followed by a break-up of the company into a civilian and military division, or if possible, find a way to create multiple competitors out of this fiasco. Muilenburg should be fired, his compensation clawed back, and the Department of Justice should clean house and indict every relevant executive who empowered what looks like fraud at the core of the 737 Max fiasco. Congress should expand the FAA so it can once again do its job. With a new leadership team in place, Boeing could fix the 737 Max and begin planning great aircraft again.
In other words, we should put safety conscience civilian engineers (AND PILOTS) back in charge of both building planes and regulating them. Otherwise, planes fall out of the sky.
Thanks for reading, and if you enjoy this newsletter, please share it on social media, forward it to your friends, or just sign?up here.
cheers,
Matt Stoller


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Teledrone
 
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Re: Un Boeing 737 d'Ethiopian Airlines s'écrase 157 morts

Message non lupar didier » 19 Juil 2019 09:31

5,6 milliards de dollars ... ça fait cher l'incident industriel, et ce n'est peut être pas fini :!:

http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/boei ... x-20190719
La gymnastique rhétorique était de ne pas prononcer le nom de Punta-Cana
didier
 
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Re: Un Boeing 737 d'Ethiopian Airlines s'écrase 157 morts

Message non lupar Dany7 » 19 Juil 2019 11:01

Il s'agit bien d'une affaire à suivre, car elle est complètement à contre courant de ce qu'on peut dire habituellement sur nos sociétés avancées.

Comment le premier constructeur d'avion au monde a t-il pu se mettre dans une telle merde ?
Comment a t-il pu renier son immense savoir faire, pour en venir à fabriquer le 737 Max, dont il savait qu'il était mal foutu dés les premiers essais ?

La production du 737 Max, actuellement invendable, est passée de 52 par mois à 42.
Fin 2019 ça fera 9 mois X 42 = 378 avions stockés au sol.

Est-ce le manque de place pour stocker au sol qui fera tomber la production à zéro ?
Dany7
 
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Re: Un Boeing 737 d'Ethiopian Airlines s'écrase 157 morts

Message non lupar Pilotix » 19 Juil 2019 11:34

Il semblerait que l'abribus 321 neo(phyte) connaisse aussi des problèmes d'assiette !
A force de vouloir à tout prix installer des moteurs de ferrari sur des 4L les deux constructeurs sont en train de prendre la mesure du sujet...
https://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/2019-0171
Pilotix
 
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Re: Un Boeing 737 d'Ethiopian Airlines s'écrase 157 morts

Message non lupar didier » 26 Juil 2019 14:21

SouthWest s'énerve, Dennis est triste :

https://www.tourhebdo.com/actualites/tr ... 521231.php
La gymnastique rhétorique était de ne pas prononcer le nom de Punta-Cana
didier
 
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Re: Un Boeing 737 d'Ethiopian Airlines s'écrase 157 morts

Message non lupar Pilotix » 26 Juil 2019 20:52

Airbus A350 software bug forces airlines to turn planes off and on every 149 hours.

https://twitter.com/breakingavnews/stat ... 8650094592
Pilotix
 
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Re: Un Boeing 737 d'Ethiopian Airlines s'écrase 157 morts

Message non lupar didier » 27 Juil 2019 09:12

Est-ce un incident ou un accident industriel :?:
La gymnastique rhétorique était de ne pas prononcer le nom de Punta-Cana
didier
 
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Re: Un Boeing 737 d'Ethiopian Airlines s'écrase 157 morts

Message non lupar didier » 31 Juil 2019 12:50

Selon la dépêche :
Ça plane pour Airbus. L'avionneur européen a annoncé, ce mercredi matin, un bénéfice net de 1,197 milliard d'euros au premier semestre 2019. Un an avant, au premier semestre 2018, il était de 496 millions d'euros. Airbus a donc fait plus que doubler le chiffre. Une nouvelle bien accueillie par la bourse de Paris où l'action Airbus était à 130 € à l'ouverture ce mercredi matin. En janvier 2018, elle valait 90 €. Soit un bond de près de 45 € en dix-huit mois.

Airbus explique ces très bons résultats par la montée en cadence de la famille des A320. "La performance financière du premier semestre reflète essentiellement la montée en cadence de la famille A320 et sa transition vers la famille NEO (remotorisée) plus efficiente, ainsi que l'amélioration continue des performances financières de l'A350", explique le président exécutif d'Airbus Guillaume Faury.

Cela doit réjouir les Gaulois ...
La gymnastique rhétorique était de ne pas prononcer le nom de Punta-Cana
didier
 
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Re: Un Boeing 737 d'Ethiopian Airlines s'écrase 157 morts

Message non lupar Dany7 » 31 Juil 2019 20:42

Oui les Gaulois d'Europe peuvent se réjouir.
Quant à Airbus, je ne doute pas qu'elle s'oblige à suivre jour par jour les déboires du 737 max.
Et souhaitons qu'Airbus en tire toutes les conséquences et n'imite jamais Boeing pour la façon dont cette dernière a pu faire admettre son 737 max.
On parle d'actions soutenues de lobbying de Boeing auprès de la FAA.
A un point tel qu'on peut se demander si le mot lobbying ne doit pas être remplacé par le mot corruption.
Aujourd'hui, qui d'autre que Boeing peut regretter des actions de lobbying à la con.
Il est clair maintenant, qu'une entreprise qui est le premier constructeur d'avions de ligne au monde, doit se référer à ce qui l'a conduit à être première et non pas se lancer dans du lobbying à la con.
Dany7
 
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Re: Un Boeing 737 d'Ethiopian Airlines s'écrase 157 morts

Message non lupar AL40 » 01 Août 2019 13:18

Dany7 a écrit:Et souhaitons qu'Airbus en tire toutes les conséquences et n'imite jamais Boeing pour la façon dont cette dernière a pu faire admettre son 737 max.


Idem pour le KC-46 Pegasus, le nouveau ravitailleur de l'US Air Force :

Attribué une première fois à Boeing en 2002, puis annulé deux ans plus tard en raison de soupçons de corruption, ce contrat fut confié à EADS/Northrop Grumman en 2008, avant d’être une nouvelle fois remis en cause.
L’appel d’offres lancé par la suite se termina donc par la « victoire » du KC-46 « Pegasus ».


http://www.opex360.com/2019/01/11/malgr ... 6-pegasus/
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